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I. ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the net-of-fees performance of North American and 
European Private Equity Buyout Funds (vintages 2002 – 2007) that invested in the 
2007-2009 financial crisis. To evaluate performance this study looks at both absolute 
return metrics such as Internal Rate of Return (IRR) and Total Value to Paid-In (TVPI) 
and the relative public market equivalent (PME) method conceived by Kaplan and 
Schoar (2005).  This research builds on a 2015 Gianfrate and Loewenthal study by 
utilizing an updated March 31st, 2018 Preqin Private Equity Cash Flow database to 
gather date-specific fund-level cash flow data on 249 buyout funds as well as 
Bloomberg historical return data on ten public equity indices. The present study 
found a mean buyout IRR of 12% and a TVPI of 1.68, slightly lower than that 
observed in prior research. However, overall 2002-2007 buyout funds did 
substantially and consistently outperform their respective public market 
benchmarks with an average PME, calculated using relevant public benchmarks, of 
1.11 for North American buyout funds and 1.10 for European buyout funds. The 
study also observed a significant downward PME trend on the vintage level 
between 2002 and 2007 as well as a positive relationship between fund size and 
performance. 
Keywords:  
Private Equity, Buyout, Performance, Financial Crisis 
 
Discipline:  
Finance 
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II. INTRODUCTION 
Private Equity (PE) is often broadly defined as the investment of risk capital1 into 
non-publicly2 held companies. PE firms acquire businesses or take stakes in them 
(often also taking public companies private by purchasing most of their publicly 
traded shares) in order to reshape their businesses, streamline operations and apply 
financial engineering tactics to harvest and eventually sell these holdings for a 
profit. Further, PE can be seen on a spectrum with two main forms focusing on each 
end of the business cycle: venture capital (VC) which aims to help young firms 
grow; and leveraged buyouts (BO), which is used to improve mature, established 
businesses.  
The inception of PE can be traced back to the earliest days of commercial activity. 
In fact, the Spanish monarchy who financed the expeditions of Christopher 
Columbus was, in some sense, a PE investor3. Starting in the industrial revolution 
PE activity quickly picked up with investors becoming more comfortable acquiring 
businesses and making minority investments, however, the domain of PE financing 
remained in the hands of ultra-wealthy individuals and families such as the 
Rockefellers, Vanderbilts and Warburgs. Towards the beginning of the 1900s J.P. 
Morgan would frequently engage in large-scale financing of industrial companies 
                                                          
1 Risk-Capital: Capital that, in contrast to debt, which might be more secure, is invested in equity in return for 
ownership positions 
2 Non-Publicly: Private companies and non-publicly held; illiquid securities 
3 Leleux, Benoit, Hans Van Swaay, and Esmeralda Megally. Private equity 4.0: reinventing value creation. 
Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley, 2015. 
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and railroads with its acquisition of Andrew Carnegie’s steel company in 1901 often 
considered the first true modern buyout4.   
It was only until the latter half of the 20th century when PE turned into a 
professional, large-scale industry and established itself as an important and 
attractive asset class to institutional investors across the globe. Today, PE firms are 
managing and raising capital at record levels with over $2.6 trillion in global assets 
under management (AUM) and a record $963 billion of dry powder ready to be 
deployed. In 2017 alone, global buyout value grew 19% to $440bn with global deal 
count standing at 3,077 deals5. Apollo Global Management was able to raise a record 
$25 billion IX fund6 and Softbank’s technology-focused Vision Fund raised over $93 
billion7 both reflecting the popularity of committing capital to PE funds. PE, as an 
alternative asset class and organization form, can now be found throughout most of 
the world; however, activity remains concentrated in the Americas and Western 
Europe. Kaplan and Stromberg (2009) tallied more than 21,000 PE BOs worldwide 
between 1970 and 2007 with the total value of firms acquired, counting both equity 
and debt, surpassing $3.6 trillion. Today, Bain & Company reports that there are 
                                                          
4 "Andrew Carnegie." Biography.com. November 22, 2016. Accessed December 16, 2017. 
https://www.biography.com/people/andrew-carnegie-9238756. 
5 "Global Private Equity Report 2017 - Bain & Company." Accessed December 16, 2017. goo.gl/cLmQMt 
6 Louch, William. "Apollo Breaks Record as Investors Flock to Buyout Funds." The Wall Street Journal. June 27, 
2017. Accessed December 16, 2017. https://www.wsj.com/articles/apollo-breaks-record-as-investors-flock-to-
buyout-funds-1498588118. 
7 Russell, Jon. "SoftBank’s massive Vision Fund raises $93 billion in its first close." TechCrunch. May 20, 2017. 
Accessed December 16, 2017. https://techcrunch.com/2017/05/20/softbank-vision-fund-first-close/. 
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over 7,500 active PE firms worldwide including around 1,250 buyout firms actively 
looking to complete deals, a number that has only risen steadily8. 
When evaluating PE the first question that arises is ultimately that of 
performance. The importance of estimating the performance of PE funds is 
quintessential for a wide variety of reasons including portfolio theory, making 
investment decisions, allocating capital across asset classes and the value creation of 
the industry as a whole. The debate around PE performance also fits into the larger 
academic discourse revolving around the performance of professional investment 
managers including that of asset managers, mutual funds, hedge funds, etc. as well 
as with respect to answering questions around market efficiency and investor 
sophistication.  
Since there is no transparent accessible public market for private equity and 
Limited Partners (LPs) are not required to report performance or cash flow data of 
their funds, researchers, particularly before the early 2000s, found it difficult to 
measure returns in the industry reliably. Among the limited databases that were 
available, data were often missing, anonymized and summarized making it hard to 
validate and analyze. 
The seminal study in this field is that of Kaplan and Schoar (2005) in which they 
analyzed the performance of 746 PE funds between 1980 and 1995 and found that 
US buyout returns were very close to but slightly below that of the S&P 500 Index on 
                                                          
8 "Global Private Equity Report 2017 - Bain & Company." Accessed December 16, 2017. goo.gl/cLmQMt 
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a net-of-fees basis9. Since PE is assumed by the investment community to have less 
attractive liquidity and risk properties to the public markets, this initial result 
indicated performance was low.   
Phalippou and Gottschalg (2006), taking a critical look at Kaplan and Schoar’s 
work, found that their performance findings were inflated10. This was a result of 
firstly sampling bias of the selected funds in the study, which were shown to be 
better performers than non-selected funds, and secondly the inflation of so-called 
Residual Value (RV) or Net-Asset-Value (NA) of non-exited investments on the PE 
firms’ books when in turn they were worthless investments. After both these 
adjustments, Phalippou and Gottschalg found that PE funds actually 
underperformed the S&P 500 by 3 percent annually. However, in a later 2012 study, 
Phalippou, as well as Stucke in his 2012 paper, noted that there was evidence of 
substantial missing cash flow data that could have resulted in a negative bias for 
measured performance. 
Within PE strategies more specifically Hwang, Quigley, and Woodward (2005)11 
and Cochane (2005)12 studied individual VC investments and also found a net-of-
fees performance below that of the S&P 500. However, for BOs, David Swensen, 
chief investment officer at Yale University, found that after examining data on 542 
                                                          
9 Kaplan, Steven N., and Antoinette Schoar. "Private Equity Performance: Returns, Persistence, and Capital 
Flows." The Journal of Finance60, no. 4 (2005): 1791-823. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00780.x. 
10 Phalippou, Ludovic, and Oliver Gottschalg. "Performance of Private Equity Funds." SSRN Electronic Journal, 2006. 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.473221. 
11 Hwang, Min, John M. Quigley, and Susan E. Woodward. "An Index For Venture Capital, 1987-
2003." Contributions in Economic Analysis & Policy4, no. 1 (2005). doi:10.2202/1538-0645.1180. 
12 Cochrane, John. "The Risk and Return of Venture Capital." 2005. doi:10.3386/w8066. 
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buyout deals that BO performance outperformed that of the S&P 50013. However, he 
did note that if one had invested in the S&P 500 with a similar leverage profile to PE 
investments of around a 60% net debt-to-enterprise value ratio, then the results 
would not have been as positive14.  
Further, a 2014 study by Harris, Jenkinson & Kaplan found markedly more 
positive results than earlier studies by showing that an investor would have seen a 3 
percent outperformance annually for buyout funds relative to the S&P 500 over the 
life of the fund15. These results are consistent with the 3 percent outperformance 
observed by Robinson and Sensoy (2011)16 and the 6 to 8 percent annually reported 
by Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003)17, who both used data from one of the largest 
institutional limited partners (LP) who, they argue, invested and diversified much 
like an index fund, particularly for buyout funds. The largest ever study conducted 
was by Stucke and Higson in 2012 which looked at 1,169 funds with total committed 
capital of more than $1 trillion and found US buyout fund outperformance of 500 
basis points annually over the S&P 500 for vintage years 1980-200818. 
                                                          
13 Swensen, David F. Pioneering portfolio management: an unconventional approach to institutional investment. 
New York: Free Press, 2009. 
14 Private Equity Replication with Leveraged Small-Cap Value Stocks -. (2017, October 03). Retrieved from 
https://alphaarchitect.com/2015/08/06/private-equity-replication-with-leveraged-small-cap-value-stocks/ 
15 Harris, Robert, Tim Jenkinson, and Steven Kaplan. "Private Equity Performance: What Do We Know?" 2014. 
doi:10.3386/w17874. 
16 Robinson, David, and Berk Sensoy. "Cyclicality, Performance Measurement, and Cash Flow Liquidity in Private 
Equity." 2011. doi:10.3386/w17428. 
17 Ljungqvist, Alexander, and Matthew Richardson. "The cash flow, return and risk characteristics of private 
equity." 2003. doi:10.3386/w9454. 
18 Higson, C., & Stucke, R. (2012). The Performance of Private Equity. SSRN Electronic Journal. 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2009067 
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As seen above, even with the immense increase in PE activity, fundraising and 
the number of funds and the subsequent academic and practitioner scrutiny, the 
historical performance of PE still today remains uncertain and hotly contested, 
particularly with the more recently raised post-millennial funds. One can frequently 
come across news headlines one day stating “Private Equity underperforms market” 
(Financial Times, November 22, 2014) and the next day “Private Equity Returns Still 
Outperform Public Markets” (Forbes, March 14, 2014), clearly iterating that there is 
no consensus both in a public and academic context. 
More recently, Gianfrate and Loewenthal released in 2015 the first landmark 
paper looking into the performance of private equity funds throughout the 2008 
financial crisis using September 2014 data sourced from Preqin. They found 
substantial annual outperformance of buyout funds of 1,158 bps versus the S&P 500 
given an average hold period of 4.0 years as well as a US buyout mean IRR of 12 
percent and a TVPI of 1.5619. Gianfrate and Loewenthal’s study specifically focused 
on both BO and VC PE strategies and their performances compared against each 
other and relative to public benchmarks through the PME method. 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 Gianfrate, Gianfranco, and Simone Loewenthal. "Private Equity throughout the Financial Crisis." The Journal of 
Private Equity, 2015. doi:10.3905/jpe.2015.2015.1.048. 
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III. OBJECTIVE AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
As such the objective of this paper is to mainly update the findings in Gianfrate 
and Loewenthal’s paper, which used September 2014 data. While Gianfrate and 
Loewenthal were able to get a first glimpse into the performance metrics of private 
equity funds investing in the lead up to and during the financial crisis using 2014 
data, 2007 vintage funds were in 2014 still only halfway through the median fund 
life span of just over 13 years20. The returns of private equity funds can only be 
properly measured accurately once the fund is completely liquidated.  
This study therefore contributes to the current academic literature on private 
equity performance by conducting an investigation into specifically North American 
and European private equity buyout performance during the financial crisis by 
looking at commonly used industry absolute metrics Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 
and Multiple on Invested Capital (MOIC) (referred to as Total Value to Paid In (TVPI) in 
academic contexts) as well as the academic rooted relative Public Market Equivalent 
(PME) metric first introduced by Kaplan and Schoar in their 2005 paper and 
subsequently used by Gianfrate and Loewenthal in their study. In addition, the roles 
of factors including fund size (≥$1bn vs <$1bn) and fund geographic focus (North 
American vs European) are investigated as well as absolute and relative 
performance of individual vintages over time. Finally, the results are compared with 
existing literature and other publicly available performance results.  
                                                          
20 Bollen, J. (2015, March 30). Average Private Equity Fund Life Span Exceeds 13 Years. Retrieved from 
https://blogs.wsj.com/privateequity/2015/03/31/average-private-equity-fund-life-span-exceeds-13-years/ 
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IV. SIGNIFICANCE 
An investigation into the performance of private equity during the financial crisis 
and its subsequent recovery is significant for a variety of reasons. Firstly, the 2007 – 
2009 financial crisis is noted by economists as being one of, if not the worst, financial 
crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s, a time period during which the PE 
industry was practically non-existent. In the words of Ben Bernanke, the former 
head of the Federal Reserve, the 2007 – 2009 financial crisis “was the worst financial 
crisis in global history, including the Great Depression”21. Further, the recovery 
from this recession has also been unique both in terms of its length but also 
weakness, being cited as the slowest US recovery since WWII22.  
 Secondly, timing constraints have prevented this time period from being studied 
by others before as PE funds, as mentioned earlier, have generally fixed term life’s of 
10-15 years . This means that only now, with August 2017 being the 10-year 
anniversary of the start of the recession, do we have the complete capital call and 
distribution data to analyze performance accurately and reliably. This issue is only 
accentuated by the J-Curve effect seen with PE investments where PE funds often 
deliver negative returns and cash flows in the early years as capital is called and 
positive cash flows later in the investment fund's life as the portfolio companies 
                                                          
21 His statement is raising eyebrows. While the "Great Recession" was scary. "2008 crisis: Worse than the Great 
Depression?" CNNMoney. Accessed December 16, 2017. goo.gl/i5SVGV 
22 He blames President Obama for the sluggish economy, and Claims He Can Do Far Better. "Yes, this is the slowest 
U.S. recovery since WWII." CNNMoney. Accessed December 16, 2017. goo.gl/HEtFN2 
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mature and distributions are paid out23 as seen in Exhibit 7 with our own results. 
This combination of uniqueness and timing constraints coupled with the J-Curve 
effect means only now is it possible and appropriate to conduct said investigation.  
In terms of this paper’s hypothesis, theoretically, because PE investments are 
illiquid, it should not be surprising that investors see some premium relative to 
investing in public markets no matter where in the business cycle the economy is. In 
addition to the illiquid nature of PE investments, there is also a larger uncertainty 
with PE investments with regards to the uncertain timing of capital calls and 
realizations. This so called “commitment risk” therefore exists in contrast to 
investing in public equities where there is no distinction between committed and 
invested capital and there is continuous trading and a liquid market. Concerning the 
financial crisis, the fact that private equity investments are privately held means that 
they should be able to better withstand the cyclicality of market cycles and thus 
perform better during an economic downturn such as the 2007-2009 financial crisis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23 Why and How to Invest in Private Equity - learn the basics on investing in private equity. Accessed December 16, 
2017. http://www.venturechoice.com/articles/why_n_how_to_inv_in_priv_equity.htm. 
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V. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
The methodology for this study is primarily derived from that of Kaplan and 
Schoar who in their 2005 paper Private Equity Performance: Returns, Persistence and 
Capital Flows first introduced the Kaplan Schoar Public Market Equivalent (PME) metric 
which aims to benchmark private investments against the performane of public 
equity, the largest investment asset class, with US Equity’s alone accounting for 18% 
of total global invested capital24.  
The PME metric is the most significant for this study as it allows one to compare 
the performance of PE funds with those that could have been obtained by Limited 
Partners investing in public equities over the same time period. The PME formula, 
seen below in Figure 6, requires for the discounting of all distributions (𝐷𝑡) and 
capital calls (𝐶𝑡) back to the start of the fund at the total return of a benchmark index 
(
𝐼𝑇
𝐼𝑡
) during the same time frame. The discounted distributions are then divided by 
the discounted capital calls to get a multiple which if greater than 1 points to PE 
outperformance and if less than 1 reflects underperformance relative to the public 
benchmark at which the cash flows are discounted. 
Figure 6- 
𝑲𝑺 𝑷𝒖𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒄 𝑴𝒂𝒓𝒌𝒆𝒕 𝑬𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒗𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒏𝒕 (𝑷𝑴𝑬) 
𝑃𝑀𝐸 =  
𝐹𝑉𝐷
𝐹𝑉𝐶
 
𝐹𝑉𝐷 = ∑
𝐼𝑇
𝐼𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=0
× 𝐷𝑡  
                                                          
24Global Invested Capital Market - Health | Aon. (2014, June). http://www.aon.com/attachments/human-capital-
consulting/2014_HEK_whitepaper_Global_Invested_Capital_Market.pdf 
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𝐹𝑉𝐶 = ∑
𝐼𝑇
𝐼𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=0
× 𝐶𝑡 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑡 = 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 
In addition to the PME metric, the industry standard Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 
and Total Value to Paid-In (TVPI) were also calculated as seen in Figure 7 where the 
Residual Value, the remaining equity or value of investments that a limited partner 
owns in the fund (otherwise referred to as NAV or Ending Market Value (EMV)), 
was taken as of the latest quarterly data available (March 31st, 2018 for most cases).  
Figure 7- 
𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝑷𝒂𝒊𝒅 − 𝑰𝒏 (𝑻𝑽𝑷𝑰) 
=  
∑ 𝐷𝑡  + 𝑅𝑉𝑇
𝑇
𝑡=0
∑ 𝐶𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=0
 
𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝑹𝒆𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒏 (𝑰𝑹𝑹):  
0 = ∑
𝑁𝐶𝐹𝑡
(1 + 𝐼𝑅𝑅)𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=0
 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑡(𝑁𝐶𝐹𝑡) =  𝐷𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡 and 𝑁𝐶𝐹𝑇 = 𝐷𝑇 − 𝐶𝑇 + 𝑅𝑉𝑇 
In terms of cash flow data, the March 31st, 2018 updated Preqin Private Equity 
Cash Flow database was used comprising 249 North American and European 
buyout funds (192 North American and 57 European) with vintage years 2002 to 
2007. Like with Gianfrate and Loewenthal, the 2002-2007 time-period was chosen as 
they are all vintage years in which the respective fund managers had to make 
investment decisions at some point during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Vintage 
years 2008 and 2009 were not included as a vast majority of these funds have not yet 
been liquidated and are still investing today, see Exhibit 4 & 5, while funds prior to 
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2002 would have been affected by the dot-com bubble, a time-period outside the 
scope of this study. 
The Preqin Private Equity Cash Flow database contains date-specific amounts 
and transaction dates of individual capital calls, distributions and residual values on 
the fund level. For the purpose of this study all values were pooled into their 
respective fiscal quarter which is much more granular than past studies which 
pooled cash flows annually. The Preqin database is able to source its data by using 
the Freedom of Information Act legislation in North American and European 
countries to gather performance data mainly from public institutions (pension plans, 
sovereign wealth funds, etc.), public filings and self-reporting. As such selection and 
survivorship bias is limited relative to prior studies which have relied solely on 
voluntary self-reported data from funds.  
The data was limited and vetted to only include North American and European 
BO funds and therefore all VC, growth equity and distressed funds were excluded 
in the sample. For further analysis the data was also later sorted by fund size (≥$1bn 
and <$1bn) and by geographic focus (North American and European funds) for 
comparison across individual vintage years. All capital calls and distributions 
reported in the Preqin database are based on a LP with a $10mm commitment in 
each fund and therefore our results are equal-weighted and not skewed by the 
performance of larger funds. This is generally in line with how a LP would diversify 
its allocations generally equally across PE BO funds. Further since we are analyzing 
16 
 
cash flow data from the LP’s perspective all the results are net of both carry and 
management fees generally charged by the buyout fund’s General Partner (GP). This 
therefore means our results are more reflective of true PE performance from the 
perspective of someone allocating capital to PE rather than the overall gross absolute 
performance, which GP’s use to advertise when fundraising.   
For the Kaplan and Schoar study, the discount rate used in their PME calculation, 
which is a public market benchmark, was the S&P 500. More recently, however, 
researchers have been trying to find more applicable benchmarks to compare funds’ 
performance by using various small-cap indexes which more accurately reflect the 
recent PE activity in smaller, middle-market companies, with the S&P SmallCap 600 
seeing the most popularity and also being used by Gianfrate and Loewenthal. Seeing 
that the average fund size in this study’s sample is $ 1,010mm and one assumes an 
average of 5 deals per fund that leaves an average equity investment of $202mm. 
With an average leveraged 4x Debt-to-Equity multiple implying an enterprise value 
(EV) of $1,010mm that falls just above the Russell 2000 Index median market 
capitalization of $ 692mm (with an average Debt-to-Equity ratio of 0.97 implying a 
median EV of $1,363mm) and just below the median market capitalization of 
$1,100mm for the S&P SmallCap 600 (with an average Debt-to-Equity ratio of 1.1 
implying a median EV of $2,310mm)25. This study uses five North American indices 
(S&P 500, S&P SmallCap 600, S&P Composite 1500, Russell 2000 and the Russell 
                                                          
25 Russell 2000. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.ftse.com/products/indices/russell-us; S&P SmallCap 600. (n.d.). 
Retrieved from https://us.spindices.com/indices/equity/sp-600 
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3000), four European indices (FTSE All-Share, FTSE Europe ex UK, MSCI Europe 
Small Cap and the STOXX Europe 600) and the international benchmark MSCI 
ACWI. Historical performance data was collected for all 10 indices on a quarterly 
basis between 3/29/2002 and 3/30/2018 from Bloomberg. Lastly, all indices were 
calculated on a total return basis where dividends are assumed to be re-invested. See 
below more information on the selected public equity benchmarks: 
Index-  Description26- 5yr TR pa- 5yr Vol- 
S&P 500 US stock market index based on the market capitalizations of 
500 large companies listed on the NYSE or NASDAQ 
13% 10% 
S&P SmallCap 600 Covers the small-cap range of US stocks with market cap 
ranging from $400mm to $1.8bn covering roughly 3% of the 
total US stock market 
14% 13% 
S&P Composite 1500 Covers all stocks in the S&P 500 (large-cap), S&P 400 (mid-cap), 
and S&P 600 (small-cap) covering 90% of the total US stock 
market 
13% 10% 
Russell 2000 US small-cap stock market index of the bottom 2,000 stocks in 
the Russell 3000 Index 
12% 14% 
Russell 3000 Measures the performance of the 3,000 largest publicly held 
companies incorporated in the US as measured by total market 
capitalization 
13% 10% 
FTSE All-Share  Represents 98-99% of UK market capitalization and is the 
aggregation of the FTSE 100, FTSE 250 and FTSE Small Cap 
Indexes. 
8% 10% 
FTSE Europe ex UK  Provides coverage of all Developed and Emerging markets in 
Europe, excluding the UK 
9% 12% 
MSCI Europe Small 
Cap 
Captures small cap representation across the 15 Developed 
Markets27 countries in Europe with 994 constituents equal to 
roughly 14% of the market capitalization in Europe 
13% 14% 
STOXX Europe 600 With a fixed number of 600 components, the STOXX Europe 
600 Index represents large, mid and small capitalization 
companies across 17 countries in Europe 
8% 16% 
MSCI All Country 
World Index (ACWI) 
The MSCI ACWI captures large and mid cap representation 
across 23 Developed Markets and 24 Emerging Markets. With 
2,495 constituents, the index covers approximately 85% of the 
global investable equity 
9% 10% 
 
 
                                                          
26 Descriptions and market data taken from official index factsheets  
27 Developed European Markets: Austria, Belgium/Luxembourg, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland  
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VI. RESULTS 
As seen in Exhibit 1, 2002-2007 vintage buyout funds, whose cash flow profile can 
be seen in Exhibit 7, saw a mean IRR of 12% and a median IRR of 11%. The study 
observed a very high standard deviation of 13% pointing to a very high degree of 
variance among buyout fund performance. For example, the highest performing 
fund in the data is the GCP California Fund managed by Leonard Green and 
Partners with an IRR of 93.1% and a TVPI of 8.47 while the lowest performer was 
Reliant Equity Partners with an IRR of -49.9% and a TVPI of 0.02. Both of these 
funds are numerous standard deviations from the mean. From the results, we find 
that the return distribution is slightly right-skewed indicating that right-tail outliers 
exist which push up the mean. Interestingly, the 25th percentile IRR is still positive at 
5%, indicating that even though these funds invested throughout the financial crisis 
the vast majority of funds still posted positive IRRs, with the 75th percentile IRR at 
16%. This indicated that buyout funds serve as a strong preserver of capital even 
through downturns like the financial crisis.  
 On a TVPI basis we see that 2002-2007 vintages had a median TVPI of 1.55 and a 
mean of 1.68. Again we see the same right skewness and large variability. Overall on 
a TVPI basis our results are almost identical to those found by Gianfrate and 
Loewenthal, however, we do observe slightly lower IRRs possibly indicating that 
these funds have held on to their residual values for longer than initially measured. 
Our IRR results are identical to the 12% average that Kaplan and Schoar observed. 
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Again on a TVPI basis we see that PE was a strong conserver of capital with the 25th 
percentile at 1.32, significantly above 1.00. 
Now looking between North American and European BO performance on an 
absolute basis we observe almost identical IRR performance, although on a TVPI 
basis we see stronger mean North American performance of 1.71 versus a 1.56 mean 
in Europe, however this difference is not significant at the 0.05 level. The standard 
deviation of North American TVPI performance is 76%, higher than that of 
European funds at 57%, pointing to the higher variability from both substantially 
higher and lower performing BO funds in North America. This re-iterates the value 
and importance of LPs being able to select and invest in the high-performing GPs as 
they are able to substantially outperform the worst-performing funds.  
Overall, from the LP perspective we can observe the true relative performance of 
PE buyout funds during the financial crisis by looking at the PME values in Exhibit 
2. This study observes a PME of 1.10 against the S&P 500 which is lower than the 
average of 1.15 observed by Gianfrate and Loewenthal mainly because of the strong 
public equity bull run seen since 2014. However, even with the recent strong 
performance of public equities, 2002-2007 vintage buyout funds were still able to 
show strong outperformance versus public equity markets throughout their fund 
lifecycle against every single index benchmark used. The highest overall PME 
observed was 1.41 against the Euro Stoxx 50 and the lowest was 1.03 against the S&P 
SmallCap 600. Not a single overall PME value is below 1.00 pointing to PE’s 
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outperformance and that even with lower IRRs the drawdown in public equities 
during the financial crisis must have been much greater and not proportionate to 
that of PE. This could be in line with our earlier hypothesis that since private equity 
investments are privately held they should, as a result, be better suited to tackle 
market and economic cyclicality due to the GPs strong incentive to cost control, 
implement operational improvements and create systematic "performance oriented 
cultures" in their portfolio companies. 
Most interesting is that when North American BO PME’s using North American 
public benchmarks are compared against European BO PME’s using European 
public benchmarks the average PME’s of 1.11 and 1.10 respectively are almost 
identical. Thus, while North American BO performance has shown to outperform 
European BO performance, when compared to their respective public benchmarks 
we see almost identical outperformance. This is consistent with North American LPs 
generally considering US equities as a direct substitute to North American BOs 
while European LPs will likely have more exposure and allocation towards 
European public equities. The only PMEs we find that are less than 1.00 are 
European BO performance against the S&P SmallCap 600 and MSCI Europe SC 
which are two of the closest comparable public benchmarks in terms of enterprise 
value, possibly raising some concern amongst LPs investing in European BO funds. 
Nonetheless against a global benchmark European BO funds still greatly 
outperformed with a PME of 1.18 using MSCI ACWI. 
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Looking at Exhibit 3, which breaks down private equity returns by vintage years, 
we observe some interesting developments. Firstly, we see a substantial drop in 
PME values from 2002 through 2007 with peak values being reached in 2003 and 
most PME values ultimately dropping below 1.00 in 2006 and 2007. While this data 
still points to early superior consistent performance of buyout funds, we do observe 
a fairly consistent decline in relative performance as can be observed in Exhibit 6. 
While this fall in the absolute performance of BO funds can be rooted in the fact that 
substantially more capital is being allocated to the space driving down returns as 
more and more BO funds are competing with record amounts of capital chasing 
limited targets at lofty prices. On the flipside we have also witnessed a supercharged 
10-year bull run with public equity markets experiencing its second strongest streak 
since World War II starting from the trough of the financial crisis in 2008. Our BO 
vintage results are inconsistent with those found by Gianfrate and Loewenthal who 
observed consistent above unit PMEs and substantial outperformance versus the 
public markets year in and year out.  
Now by comparing the results for buyout funds with committed capital greater 
than and equal to $1bn against those with less than $1bn we see that larger funds in 
every year apart from 2004, where both the absolute and PME results were 
practically equal, outperformed smaller funds. This hints towards some form of 
positive relationship between size and performance which should be further 
investigated.  
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When controlling for geographic focus and comparing the results of North 
American focused funds versus European focused funds we observe mixed results. 
On an absolute basis North American funds perform better in 2004, 2005 and 2007 
while European funds do better in 2002, 2003 and 2006. It is important to note that 
our sample data is heavily weighted towards North American funds mainly as the 
European buyout industry was still nascent in the early 2000s and thus there are 
substantially fewer observations. On a PME basis, where we compare each 
respective geographic focus to their respective benchmarks we see that European 
funds generally outperform North American funds between 2002 and 2006, likely 
because of the lesser competition and relative assets under management (AUM) in 
the region. In 2007 however, we see a strong reversal of this trend with North 
American funds performing much better with most PMEs still greater than 1.00 
while in Europe every PME dropped below 1.00. This likely tells us that European 
BO performance had a relatively larger impact from the financial crisis against 
public equities than that of North American funds. 
Exhibits 4 & 5 reveal an analysis conducted on the drawdown profiles of different 
vintages to observe the timing of investments made and capital calls conducted by 
funds. In Exhibit 4 we see that easily over 90% of funds in vintages between 2002 and 
2011 have called more than 70% of their committed capital. However, and more 
interestingly, we start seeing a fast drop below 80% of funds who have invested 90% 
or more of their committed capital starting with the 2008 vintage. This reiterates that 
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the financial crisis probably had a direct impact on GPs making investments and 
their dealflow during the financial crisis, likely due to the large uncertainty and 
difficulty in receiving financing, which BO funds rely heavily on. Exhibit 5 shows us 
the fraction of capital calls made by funds in that respective year over the total 
capital calls made by that vintage year throughout its lifecycle. We observe that 
vintages 2004-2007 had the largest concentration of investments made between 2007 
and 2009 ranging from 30% in 2004 to a high of 55% in 2006.  
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Exhibit 1 - Private Equity Returns during the Financial Crisis (vintages 2002-2007)
Sample All BO Funds North American BO European BO
IRR
Median 0.11 0.11 0.09
Mean 0.12 0.12 0.12
St. Deviation 0.13 0.13 0.13
25th Percentile 0.05 0.05 0.05
75th Percentile 0.16 0.16 0.16
TVPI
Median 1.55 1.59 1.43
Mean 1.68 1.71 1.56
St. Deviation 0.72 0.76 0.57
25th Percentile 1.32 1.33 1.23
75th Percentile 1.96 1.97 1.88
No. of Obs. 249 192 57
Exhibit 2 - Public Market Equivalent Returns (vintages 2002-2007)
US Indexes All BO Funds North American BO European BO
S&P 500 1.10 1.13 1.01
S&P 600 1.03 1.05 0.99
S&P 1500 1.09 1.12 1.05
Russell 2000 1.08 1.11 1.04
Russell 3000 1.09 1.12 1.05
Average 1.08 1.11 1.03
European Indexes
FTSE All Shares 1.14 1.17 1.06
FTSE Europe 1.16 1.19 1.09
MSCI Europe SC 1.07 1.09 0.98
Euro Stoxx 50 1.41 1.44 1.29
Average 1.20 1.22 1.10
Global Indexes
MSCI ACWI 1.20 1.23 1.18
Equal Weighted
(1)
Kaplan Schoar Public Market Equivalent (PME)
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Exhibit 4- Committed Capital and Fraction Called by Vintage Year
Vintage Number of Obs.
Committed Capital 
($ mm)
Fraction 70% 
Called
Fraction 90% 
Called
2002 50 32,992 0.94 0.76
2003 56 50,564 0.98 0.84
2004 54 47,574 0.94 0.85
2005 98 115,902 0.94 0.85
2006 121 234,158 0.96 0.83
2007 116 173,211 0.97 0.81
2008 93 167,984 0.99 0.78
2009 44 42,702 0.91 0.66
2010 49 32,661 0.96 0.80
2011 63 94,035 0.98 0.63
2012 71 94,217 0.85 0.49
2013 71 80,413 0.59 0.24
2014 82 139,850 0.50 0.16
2015 86 120,945 0.19 0.05
2016 84 121,372 0.05 0.02
2017 39 88,992 0.03 0.00
Total 1,177 1,637,570 0.74 0.55
Exhibit 5 - Fraction of Fund Invested during Financial Crisis
Vintage Fraction Invested 2007-2009
2002 12.5%
2003 20.3%
2004 29.9%
2005 45.8%
2006 55.2%
2007 46.9%
2008 26.8%
2009 11.9%
2010 0.0%
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VII. CONCLUSION, CHALLENGES AND KEY TAKEAWAYS 
From our findings North American and European buyout funds have proven to 
show strong performance both in absolute terms seen through IRR and TVPI metrics 
and in relative terms through the PME for vintages 2002-2007. We also saw 
outperformance of North American funds versus European funds but on a more 
granular vintage-by-vintage level the results were less clear. If we compare funds by 
geographic focus to their respective public equity benchmarks then we see almost an 
identical PME of 1.11 for North American funds and 1.10 for European funds. 
Across vintages we see a trend of declining IRRs, TVPIs and PME’s mainly because 
of increased competition in the PE space negatively affecting performance and a 
strong public equity rally since the financial crisis increasing the PME discount rate. 
We also observed that funds greater than or equal to $1bn showed outperformance 
versus those smaller than $1bn. This is not surprising seeing that funds with strong 
track records and proven past performance likely found it easier to raise larger 
funds. This also then raises the question as to whether this proves that past 
performance is a strong predictor of future success. Larger funds, however, should 
be able to make better use of more extensive resources and expertise as well as enjoy 
greater economies of scale with regards to fees.  
Certain challenges arose when dealing with the data that are important to bring 
up. Firstly, the way that the residual values of funds are handled is still debated 
amongst researchers. For this study we included the last reported residual value in 
the IRR, TVPI and PME calculation, however, critics and scholars have criticized this 
29 
 
approach including Phalippou and Gottschalg as PE firms have a tendency to either 
overvalue the residual value through on-paper accounting valuation or continue to 
report a residual value even though the NAV is actually worthless or negligible and 
investments are just being held on the books for PE firms to continue to collect 
management fees. Other challenges include the fact that our public equity indices’ 
returns were collected on a gross basis and therefore normal brokerage and expense 
fees, while minor, were not taken in account unlike the net-of-fees basis of our 
private equity cash flow data.  
Potential future research on this topic could include updating and further 
analyzing the performance of other forms of PE strategies such as VC funds and 
distressed funds during the same 2002-2007 time period. VC cash flow data 
reporting is known to be more inconsistent, harder to classify and generally less 
reliable as VC can include anything from seed, early stage expansion to growth 
equity. Distressed funds, on the other hand, invest in debt as well as equity 
positions, making it hard to complete a similar analysis that solely focuses on equity 
investing. 
Ultimately, buyout funds have proven to be a resilient investment asset class that 
has shown strong performance against public equities during the financial crisis. 
Buyout funds seem to have a case as being strong capital preservers with lower 
volatility relative to the large swings public markets experienced during the 
financial crisis. This ultimately goes in line with the continued interest and record-
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breaking fundraising and dry powder accumulation we are seeing in private equity 
and buyouts today. Institutional investors including sovereign wealth funds and 
pension funds are continuing to allocate larger portfolio percentages towards the 
asset class.  
While private equity suffered from losses just like most other asset classes during 
the financial crisis, the fact that PE firms had long-term time horizons and lock-up 
periods compared to public equity investors meant that they suffered from 
marginally smaller losses and had quicker recovery periods. This greater protection 
is therefore rewarded with a return premium that is observed in our results.  
Once data becomes available it will be interesting to analyze the performance of 
private equity and buyout funds after the financial crisis. With investors allocating 
record-setting amounts of capital to PE since the financial crisis and especially in the 
last five years it will be interesting to observe whether the industry will overheat. 
With valuation multiples now at all-time highs, intense competition and an 
uncertain economic outlook it is causing PE firms to remain vigilant and cautious 
even under immense pressure to put capital to work and to generate outsized 
returns. 
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